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Prom: Commander U. S. Havel Porces, Wichness

To: Communicr in Chief U. S. Facific Floot (Code 12)

Subj: U. S. Haval Porces, Vistman Monthly Historical Summary, November 1968; submission of

Bef: (a) CINCPACFIST Mr ser 1/6925 of 2 October 1960

Engl: (1) Coastal Surveillance Force Survey

(2) Hiver Patrol Porce Summary

(3) Riverine Assault Force Dunnery

(h) March Advisory Group Summary

(5) Delected Psychological Operations (6) USE Statistical Sussay

(7) THE/HES Statistical Sursary

(8) USN Civic Action Statistical Sussay

(9) Operation SEA LUMES Summary

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (9) are substitted.

2. The data contained in enclosures (6) through (8) is based on information evallable this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (6) through (8) will be reflected in November's Historical Supplement.

J. P. RIZZA Chief of Staff

COSTABLET (Hist. Branch, 5.85) CHO (GP-09891E) Director of Havel History






OPERATION SEA LORDS SUBMARY November 1968

In mid-October of this year Operation SEA LOEDS was conceived and initiated. This operation brought together for the first time in the Vietnamese conflict the three U. S. Naval Task Forces in country. The original objectives of the operation were:

- a. The interdiction of Viet Cong infiltration routes from Cambodia along canals from the Bassac to the Gulf of Thailand.
 - b. Pacification of selected Trans-Delta waterways.
- c. Pacification and clearance of the Bassac Islands, namely Tan Dinh and Dung Islands.
- d. Harassment of the enemy to keep him off balance.

 A large portion of U. S. Naval assets have been continually engaged, frequently in areas that have been under Viet Cong control for years. Thus far the following has been accomplished toward the attainment of these original objectives:
- (1) TG 117.2/VNMC Riverine Operations in the Rach Gia, Three Sisters area pacified the areas to the extent that 24-hour PBR/ASPS patrols were initiated on the Rach Gia to Long Xuyen and Gai San canals between the Gulf of Theiland and the Kien Giang/An Giang province boundary. This patrol is influencing GVN officials to continue development along the canals in terms of outpost development, hemlet resettlement, and intensified use of province and VNN boats. A renewed quality of aggressiveness appears to have been instilled in the local RF/PF troops as evidenced by their willingness to conduct ground sweeps rather than remaining close to their base camps.





- (2) On 16 November the Winh Te canal paired by PBR's was initiated and within five days of its commencement strong energy reaction indicated that at least two plateon class elements had been theoretic in their attempted crossings. At the same time PGF patrols were commenced in the Giang Thank River. Together these patrols are attempting to interdict the infiltration at the Cambodian Sorder along the Mastern Delta. SEAL operations have been conducted in coordination with these patrols.
- (3) The Cha Cao canal was cleared of sustan obstructions by TO 117.1 and harbor clearance units, opening it to normal traffic.
- (h) A PBE blockeds was thrown around the islands in the Can
 The pressing carridor and ground except were conducted on Tan Dinh, Cu Leo
 Ney, and Cu Leo Nai Islands. This island complex is still under beavy surveillance while a tight blockede has been placed around the Dung Island complex where ground except have been completed.
- (5) Since 18 October, CTF 115 has reided Viet Cong areas to keep the enemy off balance. The effectiveness of these operations is evidenced by blocksdes of legs constructed by Viet Cong in the rivers to stop these raids.

GOASTAL SURVEILLANCE PORCE SURMARY November 1968

Coastal activity continued to drop off due to sea and surf conditions along the South China Sea during the Northeast Monsoon. Total detections of junks and sampans fell to 32,655, over 10,000 less than in October.

Nearly 75 percent of these detections were checked by 14,386 visual inspections and another 10,000 boardings. As a result of these boardings 391 persons were detained for improper identification, violation of restricted area, possession of contraband and other suspicious activity. A group of seven detainees picked up by PCF 53 on 19 October 30 miles southwest of Vung Tau were classified as prisoners of war during November as a result of interrogation. Also during November there were 1,123 detections of steel-hulled vessels in MARKET TIME areas. All were determined to be on innocent passage as a result of 773 inspections and 40 boardings.

Due to weather conditions the tempo of Task Force 115 naval gunfire activity was down for the first time in several months. The November record for naval gunfire support came to 634 missions including 46 hostile fire incidents, 8 evading craft taken under fire, and more than 40 raids and intelligence probes up rivers and canals. These river incursions in support of Operation SEA LORDS in the IV GTZ were carried out by from two to five "Swift" boats. The PCFs were supported by naval gunfire from off-shore

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patrol units and accounted for approximately two-thirds of the damage and destruction inflicted on the enemy by Task Force 115 during November. Again in connection with Operation SEA LORDS, "Swift" boats relieved Task Force 116 PER's of river patrol du ies in the lower portions of the Ham Luong and Hau Giang rivers in the Nekong Delta. In addition, on 16 November PCF's began routine patrol operations on the Rach Giang Thanh up into the Vinh Te Canal to interdict enemy supply lines from Cambodia and disrupt enemy extortion of Vietnamese river craft.

On the morning of 3 November three PCF's along with VNN Coastal Group
41 units with a Regional Force company embarked carried out a raid up the
Ong Doc River, 65 miles south of Rach Gia on the Gulf of Thailand. While
PCF 36 remained a few miles from the river mouth to support a Regional
Force sweep to the south, PCF 43 and PCF 50 proceeded to a point 10 miles
up river to take suspected enemy positions under fire. Sniper fire was
received killing the after mount operator of PCF 50. During the operation
USS DuPONT (DD 941) and USCGC INCHAM (WHEC 35) provided 5-inch neval gunfire
support.

During a naval gunfire mission 7 miles east of Quang Ngal on 7 November enemy recoilless-rifle and small-arms fire were encountered by PCF 70 and PCF 75. Two enemy recoilless-rifle rounds struck PCF 70 causing heavy damage, killing one cremman, wounding three others, and knocking a Marine rider over board. Both craft also received several small arms hits. The Marine lost overboard was not found by the search carried out by PCF 75 and three other

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"Swift" boats which promptly arrived at the scene to assist.

A very successful river incursion was made on the Cua Lon and Bo De rivers at the southern tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula on 11 November. Five PCF's transiting the waterway from east to west were supported by both fixed-wing and helicopter air strikes as well as by naval gunfire from USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST 1165) at the mouth of the Bo De and USCGC INCHAM (WHEC 35) at the exit from the Cua Lon. Light hostile fire was encountered causing no damage or casualties during the six-hour transit. The air support accounted for 59 structures/bunkers/sampans destroyed or heavily damaged plus 7 secondary explosions. The MARKET TIME units destroyed or heavily damaged 248 structures/bunkers/sampans, set off 4 secondaries, and killed one Viet Cong.

These successes apparently prompted the enemy to stiffen his defenses of these areas as heavy hostile fire was encounted on two subsequent river probes. On the 13th while providing support for a VNN Coastal Group 41 operation at the mouth of the Cua Lon PCF 6 and PCF 36 encountered automatic weapons and rocket fire. One B-40 round hit PCF 36 causing moderate damage and wounding one crewman. The enemy lost 20 structures and 24 sampans destroyed. Late on the afternoon of the 24th five PCF's entered the Bo De River prior to the arrival of their air cover and ran into a well prepared enemy ambush from both banks of the river about two miles inland. The "Swift" boats were not able to suppress the heavy enemy fire and cleared the area after destroying two automatic weapons positions and killing an estimated five Viet Cong. Three "Swift" boats were damaged and three crewmen wounded,



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one seriously. Late in November it was discovered that the enemy had installed a series of log barriers or fences across the mouth of the Gua Ion River. These berriers consist of tall poles vertically emplanted in the river bottom at short intervals and strengthened by cross pieces at the top above the waterline. It is presumed that these structures have been erected to prevent GTF 115 PGF's from gaining complete access from the Gulf of Thailand to the South China Sea. Attempts to destroy these barriers have not been successful to date.

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RIVER PATROL FORGE SURMARY November 1968

GAMES WARDEN forces in addition to their normal mission were deeply involved in Operation SEA LORDS with its related Can The crossing corridor blockade and sweeps of the Bassac islands, and patrols on the Rach Gia-Long Kuyen and Vinh Te canals. Activity this month was substantially higher than last month. PERs detected 212,937 watercraft during this reporting pariod and accounted for 48,715 inspections and 100,364 boardings. The enemy was showing an increased willingness to fight as was clearly evidenced by his attacks on PERs and his stepped up attacks on merchant ships.

On 3 November, two PERs on a routine patrol of the upper Bassac River about 20 miles northwest of Long Kuyen came under automatic weapons fire. They returned the fire and saw about 15 Viet Cong running. They pursued them and took them under fire, killing 9, wounding 2 and capturing 4. A half-hour later another section of PERs keeping the area under surveillance observed a sampan with two occupants set out from the east bank of the river. As the PERs approached, the sampan tried to evade and ignored five warning shots. The PERs then took the sampan under fire and probably killed the two occupants. On 4 November, the Vietnamese Navy PERs relieved U.S. PERs of Dong Nai River patrol responsibilities.

On 7 November eight PBRs, two "Seawolf" helicopters, one LCPL with 150
PF troops from Phong Theun SS and the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY attacked an area
12 miles southeast of Can Tho in search of an arms cache. The PFs were
directed by three informers. The cache when located contained 5 Mauser

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rifles, 48 hand grenades, 45 rifle grenades, 500 rounds of 7.62 assumition, 15 kilos of documents, 100 photographs, 3,500 rounds of 7.9 assumition, one foot mine, 2 land mines, one claymore mine and 2 rounds of 81-mm mortar. No friendly casualties occurred. The next day, two PRES on blockede petrol with Vietnamese ISIL 330 came under heavy autometic-weapons and recoilless-rifle attacks from 13 positions in the same general area as the previous days operation. After four firing runs by the PEEs and two by the ISIL, "Seamolf" helicopters took the entire target area under fire. The PEEs medevaced the seriously wounded from the ISIL to Can Tho. Two relief PEEs then arrived to maintain the blocking forces. There were no U. S. casualties. This attack was determined to be a retaliation strike for the previous day's operation with the ISIL as the primary target.

On 8 November in the Rung Sat Special Zone 14 miles southeast of Saigon, two PBRs came under RPG rocket and automatic weapons fire. The cover boat received two rocket hits on the starboard side wounding three of the personnel. The patrol officer shifted to the cover boat to aid the wounded and had the boats reverse course and make a firing run along the west bank of the small canal. The enemy attack became heavier and an Army LHFT diverted to the scene and a Navy LHFT was scrambled. While directing his patrol through the kill zone that was nearly a kilometer long, the patrol officer, Chief Quartermaster Theodore SMITH was hit by a rocket and died instantly. Chief SMITH has been recommended for the Silver Star Medal for his actions. Two subsequent fixed-wing air strikes were called in to

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complete the attack.

On 15 November SEALs set up an ambush 4 miles southwest of My Tho.

Ten Viet Cong were seen in and about the area. The SEALs took them under fire and during the ensuing firefight a Vietnamese civilian guide was killed. "Seawolyes" were called in to cover the extraction and the mike boats used for the operation placed 81-mm mortar rounds in the area. Five Viet Cong were killed during this engagement.

On 21 November, two PBRs, components of Operation SEA LORDS, fell into an enemy ambush while transiting from Rach Soi to Each Gia. One PBR was hit by 3 or 4 B-40 rounds along with automatic weapons fire directed from both banks. The stricken PBR beached and the other boat came alongside to render medical assistance. Both PERs attempted to suppress the fire during the entire operation. Three additional PBRs, one monitor, three ATCs, and "Seawolves" converged on the area. When the enemy broke contact the damaged PBR was taken in tow and eventually proceeded under its own power to the JENNINGS COUNTY. Five USN casualties were suffered in this encounter.

On 21 November on the Vinh Te Canal, southwest of Chau Doc, two PBHs, participating in Operation SEA LORDS, came under RPG and automatic weapons attack. One PBR was hit by a RPG round starboard-broadside forward. The PBRs attempted to suppress the fire with no success. An ASPB that was patrolling with them and apparently not sighted by the Viet Cong opened up with 20-mm fire and the enemy broke contact. "Seawolves" were sent

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into the area but were unable to place strikes due to lack of identifying marks. Two nights later, the patrol officer who had been ambushed led another patrol through the same area. The enemy opened fire on the boats from both banks of the canal. "Seamolves" placed a strike on the ambush area and a ready reaction force was scrambled from the Vietnamese special forces camp. The PBRs and ASPB cleared the ambush area and reversed course to go back through the area with the "Seamolves" overhead. Again the enemy attacked. This time each of the surface craft were hit by B-40 rockets. The patrol cleared the kill zone and medevaced the eight wounded to Vinh Gia. The patrol officer, Lieutenant Jack BERKEBILE, USH, was killed during the encounter. He has been nominated for the Silver Star Medal for his actions.

On 24 November while on normal patrol on the upper Mekong River, about 4 miles east of Sa Dec, two PRRs came under moderate automatic weapons fire. They reversed course to engage the enemy. At this point the patrol came under intense rocket and automatic-weapons fire from at least 15 to 20 positions. Two B-40 rounds hit the lead boat and both PRRs received mamerous hits from automatic weapons. Several B-40 rounds narrowly missed both boats. The lead boat was beached to prevent it from sinking and the cover boat went alongside to evacuate two seriously wounded creamen. At the same time 13 PRRs and two "Seawolf" helicopters were scrambled to provide cover for the damaged boats and destroy the enemy. First re-inforcements to arrive rescued the three remaining creamen of the beached boat. The



helos placed several strikes on the area while attempts were made to refloat the beached boat. During the salvage operation, two mortar rounds impacted close by. The helo pilots spotted the enemy mortar position and destroyed it. All ll cremmen of the original patrol were wounded. The beached boat was later brought to Vinh Long.

On 27 November, GAMES MARDEN forces suffered their third and final fatality of the month. Two PBRs on patrol of the Rach Gia-Long Kuyen Canal, as part of Operation SEA LORDS, came under 8-40 rocket and heavy automatic-weapons fire about 8 miles northeast of Rach Gia. Both boats were hit by 8-40 rockets, one of the boats beached. Additional PBRs and an ASPB were dispatched to the scene and suppressed the fire. Six other USN personnel were wounded in the attack.

Attacks on merchant shipping in the channels to Saigon were up appreciably. Five attacks were made this month as opposed to the one made in October. On 1 November the assumition ship SS SIGUX FALLS VICTORY came under rocket and automatic-weapons fire 12 miles southwest of Saigon. The ship was not hit in the attack and suffered no casualties. PRES in the area rushed to the scene and took the enemy firing positions under fire. Navy "Seawolf" helps scrambled from Wha Be and joined the attack. After expending their ammunition they were relieved by an Army UNFT. Damage to the enemy was unknown. On 5 November, the SS PRESIDENT JEFFERSON came under recoilless-rifle attack in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The attack caused swift retaliation by GAME WARDEN forces and VNN and RF



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forces. On 13 November SS FRED MORRIS received a RPG round on the starboard side forward of Number One hatch, causing a fire. The ship cleared the channel and continued to Vung Tau. PBRs and IHFT made repeated firing runs on the enemy position receiving no return fire. Regional Force Quick-kill troops put in to make a sweep of the area but made no contact. On 14 Movember, the merchant ship TRANSGLOBE came under rocket attack 10 miles southeast of Saigon. The rocket, estimated to be 107-mm, fell short. PBRs raked the area, Army LHFT placed strikes followed a fixed-wing attack. Regional Force troops were inserted to conduct a sweep but made no contact. There were no friendly casualties. The last merchant ship attack took place on 18 November when the English tanker HALLA was attacked by B-40 rockets and automatic-weapons fire. The ship sustained a minor hole in the after deck house. Two PBhs, 100 yards astern of the tanker, suppressed the enemy fire. A Navy LHFT airborne at the time joined the fight. Vietnamese Quick-kill troops were inserted and made a sweep of the area. The troops found one B-40 round and blood trails but no enemy personnel were sighted.

Prevention of minings continued to be the order of the day. On 16 and 18 November, insulated conductor wire was discovered in retrieved sweep gear. On 18 November, a cremman of an ATC moored at Mha Be Maval Base heard a blowing noise in the water and sighted a man in the water with what appeared to be scuba equipment. The crew member threw two concussion grenades in the water immediately. A subsequent search by the harbor patrol and anti-swimmer patrol produced negative results.



A routine search of a water text uncovered two women with an excessive amount of medicine in their possession. The women claimed they were taking the medicine to their homes. Included in the confiscated medicine was 30 bottles of streptomycine, 16 bottles of penicillin, 60 ampules of glucose and assorted other pills. The two women and medicine were turned over to the National Police at Vinh Long.

MODILE RIVERINE FORCE (TASK FORCE 117)

In the devestating attack on the USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (ISTIL67) at 0323 on 1 November, the U.S. Havy suffered the heaviest loss of life to enemy action in a single incident, of the Vietness wer. Sighteen U.S. Havy men died in the attack. In addition five U.S. Army, one Vietnessese Newy and one Vietnessese Army "Tiger Scout" were killed. Seven of the 2h Havy wounded required medical evacuation. Three U.S. Army personnel were also wounded.

After officeding all troops, River Asseult Squadron personnel, and their equipment, the MESTCHESTER COUNTY was beached in Ding Ten harbor on h Rovenber in order to accomplish temporary repairs to make her seasorthy. Just ten days later, on th Hovember, the ship got underway - testimony to the profess sionalism and hard work of the Havy men from the several different units she cooperated in getting the repairs completed expeditiously. MESTCHESTER COUNTY arrived at Tokesuka, Japan, her have port, on 26 Hovember.

The NEF continued the pattern of operations which began with the reorganisation of the NEF on 15 October, with NEO ALFA operating in the eastern
Delta and NEO SEAVO to the west. Of the five River Assault Divisions assigned
to NEO ALFA, NAD 51 supported the THIRD Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps in
operations in Elen Hoa Province; HAD 52 was assigned Base Defense duties;
HAD 111 supported the 3/36th Artillery Battalion of the Einth Division; RAD 112
operated with the U. S. 3/60th Inf. Bn. in Elen Hoa Province; and RAD 151 contimued to work with the 3/39th Inf. Bn. in eastern Long An Province, operating
out of the Navy base at Sha Be. Of the three remaining divisions which were

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assigned to MED BEAVO, MED 131 provided for Base Belease, RED 132 supported
SEA EMEDS interdiction operations, and RAD 152 supported the POURTH Battalion
Vistnesses Musics Corps. The Riverine Assault Craft also supported other
troop units in particular operations during the month.

Disposal Team and Barbor Clearance Oult personnel during the period 1-6 November for salvage clearance operations on the Cho Cao Canal. Four surken barges had been partially blocking the canal. Buring the operation 1520 pounds of emplosives were used in toulve detenations. A survey following the successful operation indicated a minimum depth of six feet over the forcer obstructions.

Early on the morning of 3 Hovember operation DELFA RAIDER began when RAD 112 got underway with troops of the 3/60th Inf. Bm. and RAD 91 loaded elements of the 3rd VRIC for sultiple riverine and air mobile insertions designed to locate and engage units of the Viet Cong 516th Hein Force Battaliem and several Viet Cong Local Force Companies which were operating in Rien Hea Province.

The operation lasted unit1 10 Hovember, netting more than 100 Viet Cong Milled.
On the last day of the operation RAD 91 was ambushed twice while transferring Vietnamese Marines from the Ben Tre River to essentit landings on the Cng Huong Stream. In the first ambush two monitors were hit as about 30 rounds of recoilless—rifle fire, with small arms and automatic weapons fire, were directed at the craft. One Havy gumer was killed on M-91-2 and three were wounded.

Z-92-11 took a rocket hit in the second ambush but there were no perconnel casualties





Energy suimmer/seppers again struck the MRF the might of 15 November. The Light Lift Craft FOUR (TLIC-b), an LCU converted to salwage work by the addition of a large boom and miscallaneous salvage and diving equipment, was mined and sunk while at anchor on the Hem Luong Hiver near the entrance to the Ben Tre River. Two explosions within accords of each other were observed and the craft sunk by the stern almost immediately. Two sailors were killed and 13 were wounded, including h creamen of N-92-2 which was moored alonguide. Investigation by Task Force 117 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team personnel revealed one large hale along the port side about 15feet long and extending around the stern of the craft. Command detonating wire and other implements of mining were discovered on further searching. Almost ismediately the YLLG-2 was sailed to the scene and the cruft was carefully surveyed to determine the fossibility and method of salvaging it. Decause of the severe damage to YLLC-b and the hazardous location, Commander Service Group THEME recommended that the Medium Lift Craft (TMIC) act be risked in an uneconomical salvage effort. COMMAYFORY directed the destruction of YLLC-k to eliminate it as a navigational basard. Detonation of demolition explosives and the total destruction and elegrance of YLLC-h took place on 26 Bovember.

On the evening of 1 November Task Group 117.2 joined with units of Task Force 115 and 116 in the first combined operation in the Delta. Under the operational control of Commander Task Group 194.0 (FIRST SEA LOSD), the assault operation was launched into Men Giang Province to stop the flow of men and equipment across the Cambodian border southeastward into the Delta.





Task Group 117.2 provided troop lift and close support for the FOURTH Battelien Vietnamese Marine Corps, while conducting riverine strike operations,
and also conducted interdiction operations to prevent the flow of Viet Cong
supplies through the area. Nobile Riverine Base BRAVO relocated to the vicinity of Long Ruyen on 2 November to enhance support. The River Assault Craft
met with several ambushes along the Rach Gia - Long Kuyen Canal during the
operation. The first phase of the operation, the assault phase, ended on
6 November, while the interdiction phase continued.

As part of the same general SEA LORD operation, Task Group 117.2 supported recensalsance-in-force operations in the Soc Son area of Kien Clang Province from 9 through 11 Howesber, using the Ha Tien - Rach Giz and the Tri Ton Canals to transport the troops into the area of operations about 20 miles north morthwest of Rach Cia. This was followed by operations from 12 to 14 November in the "ThreeSSisters" area about 10 miles northers of Rach Gia. During the operation nine rounds of 105-sm were fired from a monitor indirect at a range of about \$\mathcal{j}_2\$ miles. The rounds were spotted by an Army artillery officer and schieved an accuracy of about 39-60 yards after the initial spotting round. The firing was done while the monitor was beached on the Tri Ton Canal, Lacking a fire-control computer three reference points were used: a stake on the craft's bow, an aiming stake about 25 feet from the shoreline, and an open sight positioned just forward of the computants flat. With the bow as the pivot point, the crew maneuvered the monitor to keep the reference points in line with the sight. On the lith the troops were backloaded and returned to Rach Gie.



From 16 to 21 November River Assault Craft of Task Group 117.2 shifted their area of operations to an area about 25 miles much southeast of Rach Cia. After landing the Fourth En. VENC the craft set up interdiction patrols in the surrounding waterways. Later, on 25 November, RAS 13 loaded ARVE troops at Can Tho and then proceeded down the Bassac River to conduct riverine assault operations on the Dung Island complex. While the troops searched for Vict Cong ashore the RAC joined PER's in blockeding the islands. The operation ened on 29 November, the same day that River Assault Division 151 concluded its lengthy operations at Wha Be and rejoined MED BRAVO.

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NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SURFARY November 1968

On 4 November, the VNN River Patrol Group (RFG) 51 PBE's assumed total responsibility for patrolling the Dong Nai River. This relieved U. S. PBE's of TF 116 of waterway denial operations in the Capitol Military District (CND) and released them for redeployment to the RSSZ and the Delta. The 12 PBE's of NFG 51 new provide two day and three night patrols on this strategicially located and important river east of Saigon. U. S. Navy enlisted advisors ride the VNN PBE's which this month commenced amphiblous operations with SEAL, LDNN and ARVN troops embarked. Right raids and ambushes were conducted throughout the month as the PBE's supported the landed troops in gunfire support and river blocking operations. Psychological operations (Tapes and leaflet drops) were conducted during the normal patrols in addition to routine search and inspection activities.

On 6 November, while conducting a probe of the CZ-1 Lon River, 10 miles south of Rach Gia City during a SEA LORDS operation, three Coastal Group bh junks were attacked by B-hO, recoilless-rifle and small arms fire. Three VNN sallors were killed and seven others wounded, including the U.S. Navy enlisted advisor. This embush took place in an area where a SEA LORDS PCF had just received and suppressed enemy fire.

On 8 November, ISIL 30 was ambushed by B-11 and 75-mm recoilless-rifle fire from the south bank of the Bassac River near Cu Leo Nai Island. The ambush was immediately followed by automatic weapons fire from both banks

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of the river. The ship reversed course, returned to the area and layed down heavy reconnaissance fire. "Seawolves" were called in for follow-up strikes and medevac FER's rushed in to on-load the seven VEN sailors who were injured in the opening volley. This incident served as a prelude to the Can The Crossing Corridor Campaign which began on 11 November.

A river craft team of NAG 25/29 Ca Man detachment was mined on 10 movember, resulting in one monitor, one LCM and one LCVF damaged and seven VNN sailors and one PF soldier wounded. These craft had been conducting salvage operations on the damaged boats from the previous mining incident in the same area on 20 October.

Corridor from 11 to 29 November. In concert with TF 116 FER's, MAG'S 21/33, 23/31 and 25/29 conducted blocking and search operations around Cu Lao May, Cu Lao Mai and Tan Dinh islands to deny the enemy a commo-liason route from the lower Delta to upper IV CTZ and III Corps. Amphibious operations were pursued as ARVN 9th and 21st Infantry Division and ARVN Rangers were transported, landed and extracted by RAG craft during sweeps of the islands throughout the period of the campaign.

Until 12 November when MAG 26 relieved them, MAG 29 units were employed out of long Muyen to the Soc Son area of Kien Giang Province. The SEA LORDS operation was conducted in the Ma Tien-Mach Gia canals area by TF 117 elements while the MAG craft lifted the VMMC 4th Infantry Battalion and Artillery units.

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Formerly organized as a brigade, the VNNC was redesignated a division on 1 October and was comprised of 2 Marine brigades. Brigade A operated in III CTZ under the operational control of the 18th ARVN Infantry Division until 27 November for Operation TOAN THANG, on which day the operational control of the brigade went to the 25th ARVN Infantry Division. The brigade, which was comprised of the 1st and 2nd Infantry battalions from 1 to 9 November when the 6th Battalion joined it, performed local unit operations throughout the month and met with no significant enemy contact. Until 9 November, the 6th Infantry Battalion operated independently near Duc Hoa under the operational control of the 18th ARVN Division with no major enemy contact. On 23 November, 25 Marines of the 6th Battalion were evacuated with the initial diagnosis of malaria.

Brigade B was comprised of the 4th Infantry Sattalion and participated in Operation SEA LARDS under the operational control of the 21st ARVH Division in coordination with the Mobile Riverine Force near Each Gia, IV CTZ.

The brigade was engaged primarily in recommaissance—in-force operations with only minor enemy contact this month. Several caches of essential enemy supplies and equipment were uncovered during the operations.

The 3rd Infantry Battalion operated with the MEF in the My Tho area under the operational control of the 7th ARVN Division. The Marines performed recommandance-in-force operations with no significant energy engagement.

The 5th Infantry Battalian was engaged in operations in Tay Minh Province under the operational control of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division in close coordination with the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division. Despite a significant



number of enemy war arms and material captured and/or destroyed, the Marines reported negligible enemy contact this month.



PSTURE OFFICE AND CIVIC ACTION OFFICE TONS NOVOLDEY 1900

Psychological operations had new fields to exploit this month. OperationsSEA LOEDS compaigns provided creditability to the payons them that allied forces can go anywhere in South Vietnam and that no area was safe for the Viet Cong. Another theme was emplanation of the bombing helt in the morth; it was imperative that the loyal people of the country realize that the aim of the U. S. policy was a conclusion of a just and honorable settlement of the Vietnamese conflict by negotiation and that we were not foreign our South Vietnamese allies. It was also necessary to have the people understand that the bosbing halt was not unconditional. The North Vietnamese had stated that they would never negotiate while the borbing was going on and would never recognize the South Vietnamese government as a separate entity at the peace talks. However, after avoiding it would never do these things, the Hanci government agreed in reality to do both of these actions. The third important theme of the month was the new Peris peace talks with the government of Vietnam attending. This required that the people understand that Hanei has been forced by GVN/Allied successes on the battlefield and overshelming popular support of the Vietnamese people to agree to negotiate with the GVN at the conference table. The GVN enters the new talks with the goal of a just, secure and guaranteed peace in Vietnam and that the GVN will not only play a leading role in the new meetings but will take the lead and be the main spokesman on all matters which are

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of principal concern to South Vietnam. The treatment of the bombing halt and Paris Pease Talks was in consonance with MACV/JUSPAO guidance. The three foregoing themese easily devetabled into the persistent theme that now was the time for all those who had not done so rally to the government of South Vietnam. Twenty-one Boi Chambs rallied to maral forces during the period. There are also indications that the Chicu Hoi rate in the delta is increasing since the start of Operation SEA LORDS. SEA LORDS is also instrumental in an accelerated pecification program in the delta area.

In the field of civic action ho NEDCAPs were held and 7,002 personnel were treated. One MEDCAP was held on 12 November in Binh Del District to mark the official opening of a new hardet in an area that was considered to be under Viet Cong control unitl 6 November. The MEDCAP was highly successful and the district chief requested that MEDCAP teams return for the scheduled opening of two more hamlets in the near future. In another area U. S. Naval Support Activity Detachment, Qui Nhon, contributed the building materials and tools necessary for the construction of an outdoor all-weather TV theater at the hardet of Hai Khau. The Victnamese Naval Repair Facility build the theater and the Victnamese information service provided the TV. The first night's showing of Victnamese programs on 20 November was uitnessed by a standing room only crowd.




USN STATISTICAL SUBMARY November 1968

Detections 15,159		MARKET	TIME	GAME WARDER	Mobile Riverine	Force
Inspections	Detection	ns 3°	3.778	212.937	告	
Boardings	Inspecti				100	
Craft detained					A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH	
Persons detained 391	The second secon			7	-	
Viet Cong suspects	Persons	detained	397	7 473		
Hostile fire incidents			100	100		
Enemy casualties: a. Killed 31(BC)+23(BST) 46(BC)82(PROB) 334 b. Wounded 14(BC)+10(BST) 5(BC) 9(PROB) 8 c. Gaptured 8 20 317 USN casualties: a. Killed 5*** 3 22 USN/11 USA/1 VNR/1 NVA/3 VR b. Wounded 11*** 42 63 USN/40 USA/1 VNR/50 VNRC c. Captured 0 0 0 d. Missing 1*** 0 0 Enemy material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Junks or sampans 465 126 28 (2) Structures 520 135 977 b. Captured: (1) Junks or sampans 4 2 1 (2) Weapons * ***** 1,413****** (3) Ammunition (rounds) * ****** 28,720 (4) Rice (tons) * * ***** 28,720 C. Damaged: (1) Junks or sampans 294 126 * (2) Structures 786 241 35 USN material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Surface craft 0 0 1 (YLLC-4) (2) Helicopters 0 0 0 Demaged: (1) Surface craft 66 10 7 (2) Helicopters 0 2 **						
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C. Captured 8** 20 317 USN casualties: a. Milled 5*** 3 22 USN/11 USA/1 VNN/1 NVA/3 VN b. Wounded 11*** 42 63 USN/40 USA/1 VNN/50 VNMC c. Captured 0 0 0 0 d. Missing 1 0 0 d. Missing 1 0 0 Enemy material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Junks or sampans 465 126 28 (2) Structures 520 135 977 b. Captured: (1) Junks or sampans 4 2 1 (2) Weapons ************************************						
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b. Wounded 11*** 42 63 USN/40 USA/1 VNE/50 VNESC c. Captured 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0			与外部中	3	22 IISN/11 IBSA/1	VINE /1 NWA /2 WAR
c. Captured d. Missing liming material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Junks or sampans 465		Market Market Southern	7 7 29-29-9	1.2	63 USN/LO USA/1	van/s van/s van
d. Missing 1 **** 0 0 0 Enemy material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Junks or sampans 465 126 28 (2) Structures 520 135 977 b. Captured: (1) Junks or sampans 4 2 1 (2) Weapons * ***** 1,413****** (3) Ammunition (rounds) * ***** 28,720******* (4) Rice (tons) * * 5½ tons c. Damaged: (1) Junks or sampans 294 126 * (2) Structures 786 241 35 USN material losses: a. Destroyed: (1) Surface craft 0 0 1 (YLLC-4) (2) Helicopters 0 0 0 ** b. Damaged: (1) Surface craft 66 10 7 (2) Helicopters 0 2 **			0			stand by annua
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(2) Helicopters 0 0 * b. Demaged: (1) Surface craft 66 10 7 (2) Helicopters 0 2 *			Ω	0	1 (V	11011
b. Damaged: (1) Surface craft (2) Helicopters (3) Helicopters (4) Total Control Contro			77			the state of the s
(1) Surface craft 66 10 7 (2) Helicopters 0 2 *			-			
(2) Helicopters 0 2 **			66	10	7	
			- 330			
NOTE HELD TANKED W	SAR missi		45	*	44	

Remarks:

- * Information not applicable or not available this date.
- ** Includes 7 October detainees classified as Viet Cong.
- *** Includes 3 USN KIA and 1 USN WIA by ordnance accident during NOFS.
- **** 1 USMC riding PCF lost when craft hit by rocket.
- ***** 3 AK-47, 1 M-1 CAR, misc. small arms amen, footmines and grenades.
 ****** Includes 1,265 grenades and 93 mines.
- ###### Includes 620 rocket/mortar/recoilless-rifle rounds.





VEN/THE STATISTICAL SURFACE ROVERDER 1900

VIETHAPESE HAVY

COASTAL FORCE A NEW YORK AND A STATE OF THE	DAAY AV 9124-000000000000000000000000000000000000	ING CERTAL DELIGINATION OF CHILD	4 June 17,001 20,207 21,779 7,390	People 56,320 59,268 40,138 27,423 183,149	Pete Junes 15 17 1 1 2	1000 People 100 123 51 7 347
CT CTAB	44.3	34.6	2,833	13,000	6	61
	131.8	130,4	8,559	28,715	0	33.
established and the committee of the com	16.5	42.9	7 <u>890</u> 76 <u>1</u> 39	17.571 21.2,125	<u>1</u>	<u>1.3</u> _

VISTRANCE MARINE COHES

VC/NVA & KIA 59 Captured 25 Suspects detained 112 Chieu Hod 1

XIA 9 WIA 128 VINC:

- * Provided 53 gunfire support missions.
- # Includes RAO 27, HTHO and HPC 51.

GROUP L Domeraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years

Enclosure (7)





USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUBMARY November 1968

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN DAYS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

3,931

COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

VIII\$ 4,689,512

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS:

VN\$ 508,469

PERCENTAGE OF U. S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTIN WITH:

	Percent
Other FWMAP	4.6
RVNAP	6.9
U. S. civilian voluntary agencies	3.8
Average percent of self-help by VN civilians	36.2

PROGRAMS

Spiritual parameter control of the c	Man Days	Expenditures (VNA)
Seonomic Development	685	488,599
Education	504	1,573,104
Social Welfare	2,234	1,760,221
Transportation	366	261,635
Refugee	142	833,388

INSTITUTES ASSISTED

Schools	Number 65
Hospitals/dispensaries	26
Orphanages	33
Others	141